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PREFACE
The G-24 Discussion Paper Series is a collection of research papers prepared
under the UNCTAD Project of Technical Support to the Intergovernmental Group of
Twenty-Four on International Monetary Affairs (G-24). The G-24 was established in
1971 with a view to increasing the analytical capacity and the negotiating strength of
the developing countries in discussions and negotiations in the international financial
institutions. The G-24 is the only formal developing-country grouping within the IMF
and the World Bank. Its meetings are open to all developing countries.
The G-24 Project, which is administered by UNCTAD￿s Division on Globalization
and Development Strategies, aims at enhancing the understanding of policy makers in
developing countries of the complex issues in the international monetary and financial
system, and at raising awareness outside developing countries of the need to introduce
a development dimension into the discussion of international financial and institutional
reform.
The research papers are discussed among experts and policy makers at the meetings
of the G-24 Technical Group, and provide inputs to the meetings of the G-24 Ministers
and Deputies in their preparations for negotiations and discussions in the framework of
the IMF￿s International Monetary and Financial Committee (formerly Interim Committee)
and the Joint IMF/IBRD Development Committee, as well as in other forums.
The Project of Technical Support to the G-24 receives generous financial support
from the International Development Research Centre of Canada and contributions from
the countries participating in the meetings of the G-24.ASSESSING THE RISKS IN THE PRIVATE
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Abstract
Essential services, such as water and electricity, are public goods, in that their benefits
extend well beyond the consumption of the individual. They are also critical for poverty reduction,
and must be universally affordable and accessible in order to achieve the Millennium Development
Goals. For these reasons, the standards that apply to investments in other sectors are insufficient
for essential services.
Accordingly, the paper argues that private provision of utilities requires a higher burden of
proof than policies reforming existing public services. It suggests that policy-makers considering
options for reforming essential services should look beyond the efficiency. While these are clearly
important, reform decisions should also be informed by social and ￿off-budget￿ fiscal impacts,
as well as an analysis of the feasibility of implementing reform in the existing institutional
environment. Evidence about the risks of private provision shows that in many cases, the benefits
of better performance are outweighed by costs in these other areas.
The paper identifies four common rationales for private provision and provides evidence
that challenges their validity in many cases.
Private provision helps balance budgets. When public subsidies are needed make services
available to poor people, private provision does not reduce the subsidy, and may complicate its
allocation. In addition, governments often lure firms to poor or risky areas, governments through
incentives such as tax breaks, grants, and guarantees, which entail serious fiscal obligations
and undermine budget discipline.
The private sector invests in public services. In reality, private investment in utilities has
been falling in developing countries, leaving government with the same financial burdens.
Moreover, private investment is often contingent on contractual terms that guarantee profits, or
shift financial risk onto taxpayers or consumers.
Private providers improve service performance. The record here is mixed, as actual
experiences range from improvement to disaster. Similarly, public sector corruption is matched
by corporate scandals in public services. An important reason that private provision often fails
to deliver is that governments with limited experience and resources cannot design and enforce
contracts.
Private provision makes reform irreversible. This is often true, but can be undesirable.
Policy-makers lack the information and analysis to anticipate the social and economic impacts
of policies that cannot be reversed, such as commitments made under the WTO￿s General
Agreement for Trade in Services, which could permanently restrict government￿s ability to regulate
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Recently, considerable scholarship has been
devoted to researching how best to deliver essential
services. Private provision1 is explored in consider-
able depth in both the UNDP￿s 2003 Human De-
velopment Report (HDR), entitled ￿Millennium
Development Goals: A Compact among Nations to
End Poverty￿ and the World Bank￿s 2004 World
Development Report (WDR), entitled ￿Making Serv-
ices Work for Poor People￿. Based on a reading of
the preliminary WDR draft, it appears that the World
Bank is considerably more sanguine about market-
based approaches to essential services, especially
infrastructure services such as water and electricity,
than is the UNDP ￿ or this paper.
The two documents present substantially dif-
ferent positions on the question: What is government
for? The HDR urges a larger role for government in
the direct provision of services, and is circumspect
about private provision. ￿The supposed benefits of
privatizing social services are elusive, with incon-
clusive evidence on efficiency and quality standards
in the private relative to the public sector. Mean-
while, examples of market failures in private
provisioning abound￿ (p. 113). The WDR, in con-
trast, promotes a government role in facilitating
private provision, and provides a number of exam-
ples of effective private service delivery to support
its case.
Notwithstanding their differences, both organi-
zations are careful to avoid categorical claims. The
UNDP readily concedes that private provision can
work under the right circumstances, while the World
Bank both acknowledges and finances improvements
in public sector delivery. However, policy-makers
need to undertake specific analyses to make good
judgments about which kind of provision will be both
feasible and effective. The purpose of this paper is
to make explicit the costs, risks and tradeoffs of pri-
vate provision.
Because essential services contribute directly
to livelihood, health and dignity, we argue that the
decision to deliver those services through private
providers should be subjected to a threshold require-
ment: the improvement of social equity and poverty
reduction. Specifically, policy-makers should deter-
mine if private providers are likely to deliver essen-
tial services to low-income people who cannot afford
to pay commercial prices, and if so, under what con-
ditions.
The paper also explores the following dimen-
sions of private service provision:
￿ Service delivery performance. To what extent
will private provision improve existing levels
of quality, reliability and access?
￿ Fiscal impact. When attracting private invest-
ment requires financial incentives, guarantees
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or subsidies, how costly are these liabilities
relative to options for reforming existing gov-
ernment-provided services?
￿ Balance of payments impact. What is likely to
be the impact on the balance of payments of
the outflow of profits and dividends to inves-
tors? This is particularly important in the case
of transnational corporate acquisitions and in-
vestment.
It is important to emphasize that while opera-
tional and economic considerations are significant,
achieving improvements in these areas alone should
not be taken as sufficient justification for adopting
or expanding private provision. Indeed, in many
cases the success of the private provision model is
predicated on a social bargain that excludes the poor:
higher prices in exchange for better operational and
financial performance. Accordingly, a normative
premise of this paper is that the standards the per-
tain to investments in other sectors are insufficient
for essential services. There is evidence that private
provision can bring improvements in service qual-
ity for the urban middle class, profitability for
companies, and fiscal discipline for governments.
While these achievements, when attainable, are en-
tirely legitimate, they have little to offer the poor.
This paper demonstrates that improvements in
any given area can be more elusive than private pro-
vision advocates admit. Although private provision
often achieves real improvement in some aspect of
service delivery, there is often a tradeoff among the
other dimensions. We argue that where private pro-
viders demand high or guaranteed returns on
investment for delivering quality, equitable services,
governments need to balance those costs against al-
ternative reforms. Moreover, where private providers
avoid poor people and concentrate on lucrative parts
of the population, governments that are left with the
responsibility for serving society￿s most vulnerable
people need to frankly rethink private provision in
both humanitarian and fiscal terms.
The privatization paradox
Proponents of private provision confront im-
portant questions about the role of the states and
citizens. The recommendation to privatize public
services often makes contradictory assumptions
about the capacity of governments. One assumption
is that poorly performing public services, character-
ized by corruption, low capacity or political capture,
cannot be reformed sufficiently to deliver quality
services. However, another assumption is that, given
the requirement of effective public regulation in pre-
venting market failures, the (same dysfunctional)
state will take the leading role in monitoring and
discipline private providers.
This ￿privatization paradox￿ underlies the criti-
cal precautionary principle that informs the title of
this paper: private provision of essential services
bears a heavier burden of evidence than public pro-
vision. Given the unique social contributions of
essential services and the economic challenges of
providing them privately, evidence of public sector
failure is not, by itself, sufficient justification to adopt
private provision. Private provision advocates should
therefore make an empirical case that the conditions
for controlling market failure and promoting social
welfare are substantially in place before adopting
private provision policies. The precautionary prin-
ciple is informed by three important features of
essential services.
(i) Public goods. Essential services are public
goods. The benefits of water, sanitation, elec-
tricity, and health care extend well beyond the
particular individuals who consume them.
Common public goods include improved pub-
lic health (e.g., absence of epidemics) and
greater economic productivity. As the 2003
Human Development Report states, govern-
ments have traditionally provided public goods
because ￿their market value alone would not
capture their intrinsic value and social benefits￿.
There is broad consensus that citizens should
collectively pay for ￿pure￿ public goods like
national and personal security (military and
police) and environmental protection. One
never hears complaints that such services ￿run
losses￿ ￿ even though they are financed entirely
by tax revenue ￿ because their social benefit is
so obvious. Infrastructure and social services
differ from pure public goods because they can
be rationed and are excludable. However, vir-
tually all wealthy countries whose governments
provide essential services justify the decision
largely because of the economic challenges to
providing collective goods privately.3 Assessing the Risks in the Private Provision of Essential Services
As the massive August 2003 United States
blackout demonstrated, private providers have
little incentive to make low-yield investment.
In the United States, for every dollar of elec-
tricity purchased, generation is worth 70 cents,
distribution brings in 20 cents and transmission
is worth only 10 cents. After the 1992 deregu-
lation and unbundling of a vertically integrated
sector (which separated the three main func-
tions), investment in transmission facilities
stalled, leaving the national energy grid vul-
nerable to overload.
(ii) Market failure and perverse incentives. A dis-
tinctive market logic presents serious chal-
lenges for efficient private provision of essential
services. Many have argued that increased pri-
vate provision in competitive sectors empowers
consumers by giving them choice ￿ primarily
the option to exit. However, as will be discussed
below, health care is subject to market failure
related to asymmetric information: doctors can
induce over-consumption of certain drugs and
procedures. Unlike social services, infrastruc-
ture is not a competitive sector. In most set-
tings, there can only be one energy grid or
centralized water system, making the issue of
choice irrelevant. Monopoly power enables
firms to extract excessive rents from consum-
ers lacking alternative suppliers.
For both social services and ￿natural monopo-
lies￿ claims of superior efficiency and perform-
ance can only be realized when vigilant public
regulators ￿ not individual households ￿ hold
firms accountable. However, most developing
countries have weak public institutions, which
can take decades to establish. Moreover, where
essential services have historically been deliv-
ered by the state, sudden privatization may take
place in the complete absence of regulatory
experience and capacity to monitor and con-
trol private sector behaviour.
(iii) Poverty reduction. The provision of essential
services is a basic requirement for poverty re-
duction. Essential services are widely acknowl-
edged as the principal means through which
the Millennium Development Goals can be
achieved. However, without effective public
intervention, poor people can be excluded from,
or denied access to essential services. This is
especially the case when private providers lack
incentives to serve unprofitable populations.
Where private provision requires commercial
tariff rates and precludes progressive cross-sub-
sidy arrangements, there are two basic options
for dealing with poor people. One is to let mar-
ket prices ration the poor￿s consumption of
essential services (or other consumption that is
crowded out by higher prices). Policy-makers
need to assess the impact of this option on live-
lihood and provision of public goods. The other
is to subsidize consumption of privately-pro-
vided services with public resources. Policy
makers should weigh the real and potential fi-
nancial costs of using the general budget (or
foreign aid) to provide low-cost services
through providers that require profit and may
also seek to shift operational risks onto the state.
II. Trends in resource flows
Since 1998, the developing world has become
a net capital exporter to the developed world. At the
same time, growth rates are declining in many coun-
tries. In 2000, the world community committed itself
to a set of eight Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs) that would, among other things, halve by
2015 the proportion of people whose income is less
than one dollar per day. In the poorest countries, the
shortage of capital is compounded by a drop in offi-
cial development assistance from bilateral donors.
Hence, while donors and creditors espouse the
importance of meeting the MDGs, they are not pro-
viding the capital needed to raised investment levels
to achieve these targets. For example:
￿ In 2000, donor aid for education totalled $4.1 bil-
lion, with just $1.5 billion for primary education.
In the 1990s, bilateral aid for education fell
from $5 billion to $3.5 billion, dropping to just
7 per cent of ODA ￿ an all-time low.2
￿ In 2000, the median per capita spending on
public health was $1,061 in high human devel-
opment countries; $194 in medium human
development countries and $38 in low human
development countries.
￿ In the 1990s, an average of $3 billion per year
in the Official Development Assistance (ODA)
was allocated to water and sanitation projects.
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remained relatively stable throughout the dec-
ade, at 6 per cent of bilateral and 4￿5 per cent
of multilateral aid. (Non-concessional World
Bank lending adds over $1 billion per year.)
￿ The total share of IDA devoted to basic social
services (basic health, primary education and
water and sanitation) has rarely surpassed
10 per cent. The multilateral share (United Na-
tions agencies, the World Bank and regional
development banks) accounts for a third of
ODA.
Even more troubling than stagnating aid levels
is the recent decline in private investment. Indeed,
the fact that foreign direct investment levels were
so much larger than official development assistance
was portrayed as evidence that multilateral devel-
opment banks were becoming irrelevant. Between
1988 and 1999, service sector foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) increased at an annual rate of 28 per cent
and accounted for 37 per cent of total FDI stocks in
developing countries in 1999. The share of infra-
structure in total FDI flows nearly doubled during
1990￿1998. Hence, it is significant that net FDI in-
flows to developing countries fell sharply in 2002
to an estimated $143 billion compared to $171 bil-
lion in 2001. FDI has dropped to Latin America, since
the region has sold most of its assets, many to for-
eign buyers.3
While FDI is often touted as the critical resource
for the entire developing world, FDI flows to devel-
oping countries remain highly concentrated. Today
about three quarters of FDI to developing countries
goes to just 10 countries, and most of this amount
goes to China, Brazil and Mexico. All low-income
countries combined received only $11 billion in FDI
in 2002. Economist David Woodward divided de-
veloping countries by per capita equity inflows. He
found that the 71 countries receiving less than $1 per
capita received a combined total of just 0.1 per cent
of total equity flows, despite having 22.3 per cent of
the population of the developing world.4
Moreover, not all FDI has the same develop-
mental potential. Increasing foreign investors are
spending on Mergers and Acquisition (M&A), rather
than new ￿greenfield￿ investment in new assets and
production capacity. Private provision of essential
services by foreign investors, especially infrastruc-
ture, usually takes the form of sale ￿ or long term
lease ￿ of existing assets. According to a study by
UNCTAD, the share of Mergers and Acquisition in
total FDI among developing countries ￿ not including
China, the largest recipient of greenfield investment
￿ grew from 22 per cent in 1988 to 72 per cent in
1997. According to Cambridge University econo-
mist Ajit Singh: ￿When FDI takes the form of green
field investment, it represents a net addition to the
host country￿s capital stock. However, FDI entry via
an acquisition may not represent any addition at all
to the capital stock, output or employment.￿5
Recent research not only questions the devel-
opmental potential for a large part of FDI, but also
suggests that its most common forms can actually
undermine the balance of payments. Especially when
returns on investment are very high, as they tend to
for poorer countries (reflecting the private sector￿s
risk premium) repatriated profits can have serious
implications for management of foreign exchange
(see annex A).
If the overall FDI picture is somewhat bleaker,
when it comes to investment in basic services for
developing countries, the situation is still worse.
Many multinational firms have been scaling back
their investment plans. In January 2003, as part of
its efforts to restructure massive debt, Suez an-
nounced that it would pull back from new water
business in developing countries, and curtail invest-
ment in existing operations.6 The investment
prospects for rural water service are particularly dis-
couraging. As British Environment Minister Michael
Meacher put it:
Private sector finance will certainly be impor-
tant but it will generally not be used for basic
services. Thus the World Bank￿s database on
Private Participation in infrastructure, whilst
it shows that private investment in water and
sanitation in developing countries to date to-
tals $25 billion, also reveals that none is in
South Asia, and almost none is in Africa. Yet
these are the two regions in the world without
adequate water and sanitation services. This
indicates that private sector investment is at
present insignificant at providing basic water
and sanitation services to the very people who
most need it.7
According to International Rivers Network,
￿Water multinationals have little or no interest in
rural drinking water systems. Corporations are rarely
able to profit from poor and dispersed rural
populations who mainly depend on local water
sources such as wells, springs and streams.￿8 Even5 Assessing the Risks in the Private Provision of Essential Services
small businesses appear hesitant to invest in the ar-
eas that need it the most. As a WaterAid study of
rural water reform in Uganda explains, ￿communi-
ties that are disadvantaged by the terrain in their
locality ￿ where the more expensive technical op-
tions are required ￿ are unlikely to benefit from
[private sector] projects ... Contracts to the private
sector avoid expensive deep drilling operations.￿9
The World Panel on Financing Water Infra-
structure, chaired by former IMF Director Michel
Camdessus, promotes private capital investment,
concedes that, ￿Compared with other types of infra-
structure, the water sector has been the least attractive
to private investors, and the sums involved have been
the smallest.￿10 In a meeting on water policy in
Uganda, staff from the French multi-national Viv-
endi stated that the imperative of making a reasonable
profit limits investment to larger cities with suffi-
cient per capital income. Not surprisingly, they also
indicated that the decision to invest in even these
urban areas would depend on the certainty of rev-
enue streams from either government or users.11
Similarly, in World Bank presentation to, the
CEO of another French water multinational Saur,
articulated what he characterized as unreasonable
demands on the private sector in developing coun-
tries, such as universal provision requirements.
Noting a ￿marked increase in risk for the private
operators, particularly in developing countries￿, he
lamented the ￿emphasis on unrealistic service lev-
els [which leads to] limited interest in the market￿.
He concluded that investment requirements cannot
be met by the private sector and that ￿Service users
can￿t pay for the level of investments required, not
for social projects ... The scale of the need far out-
reaches the financial and risk taking capacities of
the private sector.￿12
III. Mechanisms for promoting private
provision of services
There has been a marked trend since the mid-
1990s among multilateral development organizations
to promote private provision for utilities experienc-
ing financial difficulties. It is increasingly common
for the World Bank and regional development banks
to finance a series of reforms that lead up to trans-
ferring control of public assets to private firms. Typi-
cally these include decentralization, corporatization,
full cost recovery through commercial pricing, and
segregating profit-making and loss-making markets
(￿unbundling￿), so that profitable parts can be more
easily privatized. In some cases, the Bank also fi-
nances ￿strategic communication campaigns￿ to
persuade citizens in Borrowing countries of the
soundness of privatization.13 These campaigns typi-
cally contrasts best examples of private provision
with the worst examples of public provision.
The IMF, whose loans are widely recognized
as a ￿seal of approval￿ for developing countries, also
imposes important conditions for financial assist-
ance. It can require governments to take measures
that severely limit the ability of local governments
to deliver public services, even when decentraliza-
tion reforms devolve service delivery responsibilities
to lower levels of government. For instance, follow-
ing its institutional priority to ensure macroeconomic
stability, the IMF may pressure central governments
to: reduce or eliminate budget subsidies (and domes-
tic credit) to services, especially utilities that operate
in the red; limit fiscal transfers to subnational gov-
ernments; allow the creditors of local governments
to ￿intercept￿ transfers to local governments in or-
der to collect debt-related obligations; refrain from
￿bailing out￿ indebted local governments.
There is also evidence of pressure from multi-
lateral development banks. Conditions for commer-
cialization and private provision can be found in
policy ￿triggers￿ for lending in World Bank country
assistance strategies, as well as ￿tranche release￿
criteria for structural adjustment loans. Considerable
independent research confirms such conclusions. In
the electricity sector, a World Resources Institute
study of six countries found that reforms were driven
by the immediate need for capital, usually as the
result of the withdrawal of international donor sup-
port for the power sector. In Argentina, the IDB and
World Bank withheld assistance to the provinces
unless they agreed to conform to federal pricing re-
quirements. In Orissa, India, donors instructed con-
sultants to ￿create a process that was irreversible￿.14
In a study of ten cities by the Director of Water and
Sanitation at the Asian Development Bank, only one
(Macau) was found to have privatized of its own
volition, having done so a century ago.15
Decentralization has become an increasingly
common ￿first step￿ toward the private provision of
services. When adequate revenues are not available6 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 31
for local government, decentralization can lead to
privatization by default. When local governments
face increasing social demands without receiving
corresponding increases in resources or capacity,
they have strong incentives to unload these political
liabilities onto the private sector. As the UNDP ex-
plains, ￿As urban populations increase, fiscally
strapped local authorities cannot expand services to
cover them. As a result water services decline in
quantity and quality in middle-class neighbourhoods
￿ and fail to reach new poor neighbourhoods.￿16 Un-
fortunately, local governments are even less prepared
to negotiate and regulate private contracts than na-
tional governments, which themselves have shown
serious limitations in governing private providers.
While the logic behind decentralization is to
put services closer to the people and improve ac-
countability, in practice local governments are often
given responsibility for delivering services without
sufficient capacity or resources. ￿Financial decen-
tralization often renders local governments vulner-
able to macro-economic shocks and remedial
measures to control public expenditures and national
budget deficits ... [Amid] sharply reduced [national]
spending ... the quality and reach of public services
is bound to suffer in the absence of complementary
measures to raise local resources.￿17
While local governments may not make a de-
liberate, premeditated decision to contract out public
services, when faced with serious resource gaps they
often have to choose between reducing access and
quality, or transferring responsibility for service de-
livery to a private provider. In this decentralized
context, the fiscal rationale for pursuing privatiza-
tion may simply be one of desperation. The IMF and
World Bank have played a major role in creating
fiscal constraints that undermine local delivery of
services (see annex B).
Even more important than old-fashioned con-
ditions on loans is the emerging practice of
selectivity. Through a number of new initiatives, the
MDBs are beginning to use the ￿carrot￿ more read-
ily than the ￿stick￿, a shift with potentially profound
implications for aid allocation. The principle of se-
lectivity may eventually obviate the need for
conditions in country assistance strategies or adjust-
ment loans. As countries and localities are rewarded
for ￿good policies￿, the Bank increasingly focuses
its resources on governments that agree to imple-
ment liberalization and privatization policies. For
example, the World Bank is concentrating the bulk
of its lending in India to just three states that have
shown willingness to adopt policies that it supports.
The World Bank has created a number of re-
cent initiatives to advance the agenda of service
privatization. Four examples illustrate how diverse
lending and non-lending instruments converge on a
common policy approach.
￿ Private Sector Development. The World Bank￿s
1995 Annual Report referred to the institution￿s
shift toward direct support of private sector in-
vestment (as opposed to direct lending to
governments) as ￿a dramatic departure from
what had been Bank policy for half a century￿.
The Private Sector Development (PSD) Strat-
egy, which was approved by the World Bank￿s
Board in February 2002, puts real power be-
hind this shift.18 Under the PSD strategy, the
World Bank￿s private sector affiliate, the Inter-
national Finance Corporation (IFC), is to team
up with the International Development Asso-
ciation (IDA), the World Bank￿s concessional
loan arm, to privatize services in low-income
countries, including ￿frontier￿ areas, such as
social programs and basic infrastructure. The
Strategy￿s purpose is to transform much of the
World Bank Group￿s traditional operations into
support for the role of the private sector.
￿ Output-based aid. The World Bank is scaling
up the financing of infrastructure and social
service projects through output-based aid
(OBA) design.19 OBA projects delegate serv-
ice delivery to private ￿third parties￿ under
contracts that tie provision of financial support
to the outputs or services actually delivered.
(Challenges to implementing so-called ￿per-
formance-based￿ contracts are discussed in the
following section). A Global Partnership for
OBA was launched in 2003 by the World Bank
Group, with support from DFID. It is now ex-
perimenting with and scaling up OBA schemes,
some of which would provide subsidies to cor-
porations when they deliver services or meet
certain performance benchmarks. Examples of
pro-poor OBA payments include one-time
payment for expanding coverage (e.g., through
new connections), gradually reduced financial
support for phased tariff increases, ongoing sub-
sidies for minimum consumptions in poor
households.7 Assessing the Risks in the Private Provision of Essential Services
￿ Community-driven development. One approach
to private service provision that the World Bank
has embraced with particular enthusiasm is
community-driven development (CDD), which
currently absorbs about half of IDA credits and
grants. According to the Bank￿s website, CDD
gives control of decisions and resources to com-
munity groups, not local governments. ￿These
groups often work in partnership with demand-
responsive support organizations and service
providers including elected local governments,
the private sector, NGOs, and central govern-
ment agencies￿￿ A common type CDD is the
Social Fund, through which the Bank has chan-
nelled $3.7 billion in 57 countries, with donor
and government co-financing bringing the to-
tal to about $9 billion. Social Fund resources
are distributed directly to communities, rather
than local governments, and often contain thou-
sands of sub-projects, which are bid out to
private and non-profit contractors. In light of
concerns over weak local level governance,
some have expressed concerns about how
effectively CDD approaches prepare local gov-
ernments to facilitate transparent privatization,
or manage financial resources.20
￿ LICUS. The World Bank addressed the special
needs of failed states through its Low-Income
Countries Under Stress (LICUS) program.
LICUS turns the idea of improving governance
on its head. Rather than building the institu-
tions of governance, an external institution ￿
the independent service authority (ISA) ￿ sim-
ply replaces the state￿s essential functions
altogether. ISAs are largely autonomous from
government, with high standards of account-
ability directly to donors. They are wholesale
institutions, contracting out services with mul-
tiple providers, including firms and NGOs, for
retail services that they monitor and compare
to ensure cost-effectiveness.
In addition to pressure to implement policies
that may not be appropriate or feasible, borrowing
countries may have other economic and operational
reasons for reducing reliance on external donors.
Critics of foreign aid projects have long argued that
development projects create financial traps related
to recurrent costs, such as salaries, maintenance, fuel
and routine supply requirements. For this reason,
some governments prefer to borrow only for ￿one-
time￿ capital expenditures, such as construction, and
fund essential service provision only through user
fees and budget outlays. Just as important as finan-
cial sustainability is operational sustainability, and
area in which MDBs have not had a good record. In
1993, only 27 per cent of World Bank-financed wa-
ter projects had likely sustainability (defined as
long-term provision of continued benefits after
project completion), while today the figure stands
at around 40 per cent.21
IV. Rationales for private provision of
essential services
This section will evaluate four common ration-
ales given for privatizing essential services: budgetary
discipline, attracting private investment, improved
efficiency and performance, and irreversibility. It is
not argued that these rationales are categorically
invalid. Rather, this section highlights risks that may
make each rationale less compelling, or irrelevant,
and provides illustrative examples of those risks.
Rationale no. 1 ￿ balancing budgets
The first rationale for privatization is that it
provides important benefits for budget stability. By
freeing up scarce budgetary resources, governments
that sell off public assets or put them under private
management can dedicate those funds to other press-
ing social goals. Unfortunately, this rationale has
been used to privatize even well-functioning serv-
ices, as the sale of attractive assets generates a
one-time revenue windfall. From the perspective of
private sector bidders, the most attractive services
are those that already perform efficiently and satisfy
a broad, lucrative customer base. Thus governments
searching for large ￿lump sum￿ revenue gains may
be tempted to trade away viable and effective serv-
ices. There is often an inherent tension between
profitability on one hand, and competition and pov-
erty reduction on the other. Some governments have
enticed companies to make high offers by allowing
arrangements that have little to do with the public
interest. As several World Bank researchers explain:
In many countries, privatization transactions
are spearheaded by the Ministry of Finance,
which tends to view the process in narrow
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mizing the fiscal revenues from the asset sale.
This is unfortunate because there are some
important trade-offs between the sale value of
the assets, and the downstream economic and
social impacts of the reform. For example,
revenue considerations point toward keeping
service tariffs high, minimizing rollout obli-
gations, postponing the introduction of com-
petition, and overlooking many of the details
of regulation. However, experience shows that
these are precisely the strategies that are likely
to be most damaging to the poor ...22
Privatization of well-functioning services that
are financially viable are particularly dubious. In the
mid 1990s, Gabon￿s water utility SEEG was doing
fine before being privatized, even in the opinion of
officials involved in the sale. According to IFC in-
vestment officer Francois Wohrer, just before the sale
SEEG was a ￿relatively wealthy company ... and will
make a decent profit in 1996 ... The company was a
little messy before 1993 but there has been a nice
cleaning process over the last three years. There is
no overstaffing and the company is quite well man-
aged.￿23
Stopping losses by reducing subsidies
While the revenue-generating rationale has
been used to justify selling of good services, fiscal
considerations have greater legitimacy for bad ones.
From a fiscal perspective, getting rid of loss-mak-
ing services to improve macroeconomic discipline
is more justifiable than selling off profitable or
budget-neutral services. However, any fiscally-
driven decision to privatize should be informed by
an analysis of the cause of losses.
Some advocates of privatization argue that the
problem underlying loss-making government serv-
ices is invariably inefficiency. In many cases, there
is certainly a valid case that public service organi-
zations use up more general tax revenues than they
need to. At the same time, as argued earlier in the
discussion about public goods, the mere existence
of a fiscal loss is not an argument for privatization
of essential services. Indeed, one of the main char-
acteristics of public goods is that they can only be
provided through collective contributions from all
citizens ￿ that is, at a loss.
Privatization inevitably commercializes prices
through user fees. Without some sort of subsidy
mechanism, the poor will not be able to afford es-
sential services, leading to both greater poverty and
reduction of public goods provision. For this rea-
son, the implementation or expansion of user fees
almost invariably entails a subsidy dimension. The
practicality of reducing poverty through targeted
subsidies has therefore received considerable atten-
tion. Unfortunately, targeted subsidies often fail to
reach the intended beneficiaries. The extent of sub-
sidy leakage in fee-based systems is demonstrated
in a study of Chile￿s private water provision, which
found 80 per cent exclusion of poor people, and
80 per cent inclusion of affluent people.24 The find-
ing is particularly troubling given that Chile￿s
institutional capacity is among the best in the devel-
oping world.
While subsidies often contribute little to pov-
erty reduction, user fees themselves may contribute
little to financial viability of essential services, es-
pecially in very poor areas. Health care cost recovery
experiences in African countries shows that average
fees yield only around 5 per cent of operating costs.
The net yields are lower ￿ or even negative ￿ when
collection costs are factored in. This finding is con-
firmed by a Harvard University study of health care
in the United Republic of Tanzania which found that
the administration of the user fee program cost more
than the user fee revenues.25 While these may be
extreme examples, administration of subsidy systems
in low-income countries inevitably create costly bu-
reaucratic systems for implementation. Where private
provision is linked to fiscal measures that preclude
progressive cross-subsidies ￿ especially in the con-
text of widespread poverty ￿ then the state may have
to commit to long-term transfers from the regular
budget (or foreign aid).26
Unfortunately, there is no evidence that sub-
sidy systems under private provision are any more
effective than those under public provision. Accord-
ing to the World Bank￿s Operations Evaluation
Department, ￿getting the private sector to focus on
the alleviation of poverty and to design tariffs in a
way that does not discriminate against the poor has
proved hard to achieve in practice ...￿27 Under tradi-
tional arrangements, government typically provide
a direct subsidy to means-tested households, or to
communities designated as poor. Under ￿output-
based￿ contracts (see section III above) governments
could pay the private provider a fee for each low-
income customer served at reduced prices.28 Such
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provider, while requiring the government to incur sub-
stantial monitoring costs in order to ensure compliance.
Fiscal costs of attracting private capital
As discussed in section II, the more a private
provider is expected to serve the interests of poor or
excluded users, the less attractive will become the
opportunity to invest in the sector. However, the
unwillingness of private firms to invest in low-in-
come people has much of the development
community not to re-think privatization, but rather
to re-think how to finance privatization. The influ-
ential Financing Water for All (commonly known
as the Camdesssus report) specifically recommends
greater use of multilateral guarantees for private in-
vestment, as well as direct use of development
assistance to ￿facilitate water projects managed by
private operators under public control￿. The global
development institutions have increasingly turned
to financial incentives to attract private providers
into otherwise financially unattractive investments.
The use of such mechanisms to attract private
financing underscores an apparent double standard.
When governments run losses to subsidize publicly
delivered services, conventional wisdom is that such
arrangement are not financially sustainable. How-
ever, when funds from the same public sector (or
lending institution) are used to finance private pro-
vision of the same service, the arrangement is
characterized as an innovative approach to poverty
reduction.
The salient point is that government must en-
gage in some form of social redistribution when poor
people cannot afford basic services. From a finan-
cial perspective, the main question in considering
the choice of provider is: which is likely to cost the
government more money? In many cases a public
service may require significant subsidies, especially
if it has to reach a lot of poor people. These ￿loss-
making￿ enterprises are one of the main justifications
for bringing in private firms. But if governments have
to offer major financial incentives to succeed in at-
tracting more private capital, policy-makers need to
ask how high that price is, and if it justifies a major
policy change.
It is increasingly common for the public sector
to channel financial support to private providers in
the effort to lure new investment in services. As one
labour union researcher concludes: ￿Lease contracts
in the water sector are designed to ensure that the
risk levels that private firms face are not so high
that they will put off investing. Private operators are
usually invited to take over responsibility for oper-
ating and managing the network, but are not required
to invest in the infrastructure.￿29 This finding is cor-
roborated even by institutions that support private
provision. As the World Bank explains, incentives
to attract private firms include ￿cash contributions
during the construction period; subsidies during the
operating period, e.g. in the form of non-refundable
grants; and a favourable tax regime ￿ including tax
holidays, refunding of tax on construction and oper-
ating costs.￿30
Under World Bank tutelage, the Government
of Pakistan began allowing private ownership of
electricity generation plants in 1992. After two years
without investment, a high level government com-
missioned produced the ￿Policy Framework and
Package of Incentives for Private Sector Power Gen-
eration Projects in Pakistan￿, which included: bulk
tariff of United States cents 6.5/kWh for the sale of
electricity to the public utility, with indexation for
fuel prices, United States and Pakistani inflation, ex-
change rate fluctuations, and operating and mainte-
nance costs (see following section for more details),
exemption from corporate income tax, customs du-
ties, sales tax, and other surcharges on imported
equipment, and permission for power generation
companies to issue corporate bonds and shares at
discounted prices.31
Examples abound throughout the developing
world. In 2001, the Kenyan government suspended
a water contract with a subsidiary of Vivendi.
Originally this was a $5m billing and account-
ing project but there was an outcry when crit-
ics pointed out that Sereuca would not invest
any money in infrastructure during the
10  years that the contract was to be in force
but was to just install a new billing system at
City Hall for which the company was to earn
14.9 per cent of the Ksh12.7 billion ($169 mil-
lion) collected over the period. Furthermore,
the city council￿s water and sewerage depart-
ment was supposed to reimburse the cost of
the computer equipment and hardware to the
company at the end of the 10 years with no
provision for depreciation.32
In South Africa, a power consortium led by the
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quarter of capital investment in upgrading and ex-
panding service in the Nelspruit municipality. The
majority of capital for this private venture was sup-
plied by the South African Development Bank.33 In
Honduras, AES obtained exemptions on all taxes and
charges as a condition for building an 800 MW power
plant in Puerto Cortes.
On top of government incentives to attract capi-
tal are multilateral guarantees to reduce corporate
risk. These instruments are usually provided by the
World Bank￿s private sector affiliates, the Interna-
tional Finance Corporation (IFC) and the Multilateral
Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), which protect
against commercial and political risks, respectively.
When private firms lend to or invest in a utility
project in a country, the Bank￿s guarantee promises
the private firms compensation for certain losses if,
under specified conditions, the government does not
meet its obligations. The borrower may be the mem-
ber country or a private company.
Multilateral guarantees can dramatically in-
crease the ￿off-budget￿ fiscal burdens of recipient
countries Subsovereign guarantees provided to state
and local governments currently require backing by
the central government. However, this requirement
may soon be eliminated. When that happens, if pri-
vate ventures backed by a subsovereign guarantee
fail, the local government is likely to assume large,
debt-like financial obligations without any mechanisms
for restructuring or writing down the obligations.
Guarantees can account for half or even more of the
indebtedness in a given infrastructure service sec-
tor. (On the potential fiscal costs of guarantees, see
annex C.)
In June 2000 MIGA paid out a claim for politi-
cal risk insurance for the first time.34 It made a
payment of $15 million to Enron when the Indone-
sian government cancelled a power project. The
contract ￿ to build, operate and maintain a 500-mega-
watt power plant near Surabaya ￿ was one of several
independent power producer (IPP) contracts signed
with the dictatorship of President Suharto. The con-
tracts were suspended in 1997 in response to the
country￿s economic crisis and the collapse of the
rupiah, the Indonesian currency. A power utility,
PLN, made clear to all the independent power pro-
ducers in the country that it simply could not afford
to pay the prices specified in the their long-term
power purchasing agreements. Moreover, PLN and
other utilities nullified the contracts on the grounds
that they were created in a corrupt manner. The ra-
tionale for the cancellation and the payment of the
claim were straightforward. However, after the pay-
ment was made, MIGA insisted that the Indonesian
government reimburse the $15 million. As an incen-
tive, MIGA refused to issue any more coverage for
business in Indonesia until it was paid. After lengthy
negotiations, the government agreed to repayment
terms. Only then did MIGA consent to provide in-
surance coverage for investors in Indonesia once
again.
This episode was remarkable because the
project was recognized even by MIGA as economi-
cally and politically unsustainable. The guarantee
agency actually agreed that proceeding with the
project was not a viable policy option. ￿While we
understand the circumstances that led to (the Enron)
project suspension, international law dictated that
the cancellation be compensated￿, said Luis Dodoro,
MIGA￿s general counsel and World Bank Group
vice-president. Thus, Indonesian taxpayers have to
pay the bill for a politically corrupt and economi-
cally unviable contract signed between a dictatorship
and a multinational firm. Enron, which negotiated
the agreement, has received compensation, while the
government of Indonesia has reimbursed MIGA.
Rationale no. 2 ￿ attracting investment capital
The second principle rationale for private pro-
vision of essential services is that the private sector
has access to far more capital resources than cash-
strapped, deficit-ridden governments. Especially for
sectors with high sunk costs, such as infrastructure,
it is argued that fiscal constraints (or the inability to
impose higher user fees) cripples developing coun-
try governments in their quest to upgrade and expand
expensive services. However, as we saw in section II,
expectations about private capital have run far ahead
of actual investment levels, especially in the places
that need it the most.
Reducing poverty
The most explicitly ￿social￿ rationale for pri-
vate service provision is that it reduces poverty. It
does so by increasing capital investment in infra-
structure and social services used by poor people,
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where government has failed to invest in marginalized
people, because of budget constraints or lack of po-
litical priorities, many argue that private capital
represents the only viable opportunity for reaching
these excluded citizens. Indeed, during the boom-
ing 1990s, market reformers made a mantra of the
argument that the private sector was the only viable
source of capital for major public investment. Par-
ticularly in the capital-intensive utility sectors,
cash-strapped governments were portrayed as un-
able to keep up even with basic maintenance, much
less to expand or upgrade costly infrastructure. How-
ever, large corporations and nimble capital markets
could make large investments wherever needed.
As discussed in section II, these cheerful pre-
dictions have fallen flat. Because of the dynamic of
￿cherry picking￿, corporations have little incentive
to invest in ￿unprofitable people￿. In the case of utili-
ties, private providers like to expand household
access (e.g., hook up water pipes, make connection
to electrical grid) or upgrade services in urban ar-
eas, especially where middle class consumers
demand more and better services. They are less likely
to go into peri-urban, slum or rural areas, where to-
pography is more difficult, per capita consumption
is less, and most importantly, incomes are lower.
Because the poor tend to live in outlying urban and
remote rural areas, the unit costs of providing them
with utility services may actually be much higher
than for wealthier people living in major cities.
Moreover, variation in investment location within
countries is replicated on a global scale. Of total for-
eign investment in private infrastructure, very poor
countries have received only a tiny fraction of that
capital.35
There are numerous examples that illustrate
how capital investment fails to reach the poor. In
the Indian city of Tiripur, a textile and garment center,
a consortium comprised of United Utilities (United
Kingdom), Bechtel and a local partner are working
with the state government development corporation
to deliver piped water to customers who now rely
on tanker trucks. Under current plans, the knitwear
industry would receive 115 million liters per day (mld).
￿Tirupur municipality, which includes 60,000 slum
dwellers, will get 26 mld, while 792 rural settlements
in its neighborhood will share the remaining 36 mld.￿36
After the British firm BiWater pulled out of a
privatisation project in Zimbabwe because local con-
sumers could not pay high enough prices to generate
a sufficient profit, the company￿s manager remarked:
￿Investors need to be convinced that they will get
reasonable returns. The issues we consider include
who the end users are and whether they are able to
afford the water tariffs. From a social point of view,
these kinds of projects are viable but unfortunately
from a private sector point of view they are not.￿37
Cherry-picking incentives also constrain invest-
ment in social services. In the health care sector,
doctors want serve patients with higher incomes,
while insurance companies want to avoid sick cus-
tomers, and drop those who develop conditions
requiring medical attention. Expanding direct pri-
vate provision of health care affects rich and poor
countries alike. Under Germany￿s deregulation,
￿people with a sufficiently high income are allowed
to opt out of the statutory health insurance funds.
The private insurers can offer their services to young
(and healthy) people far more cheaply. As a result,
the statutory health insurance funds are retaining a
larger proportion of higher cost members.￿38
An IDB paper on privatization in Chile reports
how health insurers ￿try to exclude beneficiaries who
develop expensive illnesses￿. Although government
responded by requiring them to renew all policies
upon request, the insurers ￿have found a way around
this obligation: they raise the price of the renewal
plans while offering new plans with similar benefits
at the original lower prices to clients that do not repre-
sent as high a risk level.￿39 This finding is reinforced
by the Social Watch country report, which states that
commercially priced health insurance for women of
child-bearing years is three to four times higher than
for men in the same age bracket.40
Shifting risk, guaranteeing profits
The World Bank strongly promotes private par-
ticipation in water and sanitation, and agrees that
such arrangement must ensure the profitability of
firms that risk large amounts of capital. One Bank
researcher called for ￿the need for realism￿ and
warned that naive developing country officials may
openly question the need for adequate profit levels.
There is often a sharp difference between what
private companies see as the minimal return
necessary to go into business in a risky coun-
try and what governments view as an accept-
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country governments considering private par-
ticipation in water will all be familiar with the
gasps of disbelief and indignation when they
first voice assumptions about expected returns
on equity.) Governments that have happily (or
at least blindly) tolerated high levels of rent
seeking and wasteful behavior by public wa-
ter company officials can become positively
puritanical about relatively modest profit tak-
ing by a private company. This is not to say
that private companies with a monopoly to
supply water services should be allowed to
take any level of profit that they choose. But
governments should be realistic about the prof-
its that they should allow, recognizing the need
of their private partners to earn a reasonable
return and to be rewarded for the risks that
they shoulder.41
Needless to say, what constitutes ￿minimal re-
turn￿ and ￿relatively modest profit￿ is a judgment
call. Governments that are admonished to be ￿real-
istic￿ routinely confront private firms that have
strong incentives to overstate the costs of providing
services. Moreover, once private providers win a
concession, they also exercise control over finan-
cial information that governments need to assess their
claims.
The record of private service provision is lit-
tered with examples of contracts that guaranteed
profits for firms while placing virtually all risk onto
the government and consumers. The most direct way
that firms avoid commercial risk is through contracts
that quantify profit margins. For example, in
Cochabamba, Bolivia, where civil society mobili-
zation against water price hikes exploded into a
political crisis, the public auction for the city￿s water
system featured exactly one bid. The Bechtel-owned
consortium Aguas del Tunari, negotiating terms with
a government lacking any real bargaining leverage,
demanded exclusive rights to all local water re-
sources, as well as a guaranteed 15 per cent profit
margin, which would be indexed to the United States
inflation.42 Enron￿s ill-fated gas-fired power plant
in Dahbol was initially granted a 16 per cent guar-
anteed return by the Indian government, in top of a
five year tax exemption.
Some private provision arrangements create
enormous contingent liabilities for governments. A
good example is the so-called ￿take-or-pay￿ contract.
In the energy sector, power purchasing agreements
(PPAs) commit the government to purchase a pre-
determined quantity of production regardless of eco-
nomic conditions. Although such obligations are not
technically debts, they can actually be more intrac-
table than traditional debt because they are not
subject to rescheduling and write-downs. As a sur-
vey of financially disastrous power purchasing
agreements concludes: ￿bankruptcy is not an option
under the contract terms.￿43 For this reason, policy-
makers need to assess the potential off-budget
implications of private provision options.
In the Indian state of Maharashtra, Enron￿s
$3 billion Dahbol power plant was touted as the
country￿s largest foreign investment project. How-
ever, over a decade after Enron formed the Dahbol
Power Corporation (in partnership with Bechtel and
General Electric), the plant is dormant while a bitter
legal dispute between the government and DPC con-
tinues. In the midst of allegations of government
oppression against protesters, the operators have
been the charged with manipulating prices through
a PPA. At the end of 2000, the Maharashtra State
Electricity Board claimed that the DPC was charging
over double the rate of comparable publicly-owned
generators. The Board subsequently called a mora-
torium on payments to the DPC and in May 2001
cancelled the PPA, which led Enron to shut down
operations.44 The case remains tied up in litigation
in multiple venues, while the power plant physically
deteriorates as it remains mothballed. (For a case
study of a failed PPA in Pakistan, see annex D.)
In Uganda, the United States energy firm AES
negotiated a PPA for the Bujagali hydroelectric
project that was later shown to be excessively ex-
pensive. The government has little experience with
such contracts, and relied on World Bank advice in
setting up the PPA provisions. An independent re-
view by an Indian consulting firm concluded that
not only were capital costs the same as other power
plants with twice the generating capacity, but the
PPA imposes excessive payment requirements and
restricts the government￿s ability to sign other agree-
ments that could reduce its fiscal exposure.45
Long-term power contracts have generated
numerous disputes with governments which accused
companies of extracting excessive financial benefits
through high prices or selling unneeded energy. In
addition to the cases described above, such contracts
have been renegotiated or cancelled in Croatia, In-
donesia, Hungary, Costa Rica and the Dominican
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Rationale no. 3 ￿ improved efficiency and
performance
The third rationale for privatization of essen-
tial services is both common and compelling:
superior efficiency and performance of private pro-
viders. Privatization advocates often portray public
sector providers as bound by bureaucratic inertia,
lacking incentives to innovate, and unresponsive to
helpless consumers who have nowhere else to go.
Private providers are expected to improve efficiency
and expand service because of inherent incentives
to cut costs and to satisfy a growing number of pay-
ing customers. The state retains the role of market
regulator.
There is considerable evidence supporting
claims of that privatized firms have performed bet-
ter than the state-run services that they replaced.
Research on privatization of state-owned enterprises
(SOEs) reveals overwhelming evidence of increased
efficiency and profitability.47 Moreover, efficiency
improvement in basic services has often been ac-
companied by improved service quality and access.
A review of evidence by a former World Bank econo-
mist and IDB vice president concluded that, while
privatization in developing countries was associated
with worse distribution of assets, it has increased
access to utilities such as electricity for poor people.48
In addition, anecdotal evidence about improved
performance makes clear that private service provi-
sion can bring significant benefits in terms of both
financial sustainability and consumer welfare.49 For
example, while the failure of the Maynilad water
concession in Manila has eroded the enthusiasm over
this ￿model￿ of privatization, the chief regulator of
the water utility involved in the dispute has vigor-
ously defended the policy itself. He notes that tap
water is actually cheaper now than before privatiza-
tion, and that the other privatized concession in
Manila is performing quite well financially. ￿Also,
there are now 9.8 million people who have connec-
tions as compared with only 7.3 million people prior
to privatization ... The water coverage was only
67 per cent then and now it is 92 per cent ...￿50
A review of privatization in Chile reveals sig-
nificant gains in productivity for private electricity
generation (though less so for distribution, indicat-
ing that competition can have powerful effects).51
Even more impressively, Chile￿s privatized water
system makes safe water available to 97 per cent of
its urban population and sanitation to 80 per cent. In
Cartagena, Colombia, the private venture Acuacar
has proved considerably more responsive to its us-
ers than the public utility and has undertaken
substantial improvements in maintenance and reha-
bilitation ￿ the first investments to occur after an
11-year hiatus. Water quality has also improved.
Even privatizations that have been plagued by
problems have shown important improvements. In
Nelspruit, South Africa, despite the threat of finan-
cial collapse because of rampant non-payment, the
private firm BiWater has added thousands of new
connections and meters and water reliability has sig-
nificantly improved. In Trinidad and Tobago, despite
the financial failure of an interim operating agree-
ment with Severn Trent, the first two years saw an
increase in average water production, greater distri-
bution of potable water to the country￿s southern
region, rehabilitation work on pipes and a rural wa-
ter supply project benefited several hundred thousand
customers.52
The main indicator for performance in virtu-
ally all privatization studies is profitability or effi-
ciency. However, the profitability indicator is an
inappropriate measure for the performance of essen-
tial services, as it reflects the satisfaction of share-
holders, not consumers. The indicator of efficiency,
such as labour productivity or number of outputs per
cost unit, is a legitimate consideration ￿ but it is not
the only one. Essential services are expected not only
to run efficiently, but also to provide high quality
service and reach the poor. Equity goals in particu-
lar, however, may undermine efficiency.
Moreover, even taking efficiency on its own
terms, comparative evidence does not always sup-
port private provision. A recent statistical analysis
of efficiency among public and private water com-
panies in Asia revealed that there is no significant
difference.53 In a comparison of five countries with
public (United States, Japan, and the Netherlands)
and private (France, United Kingdom) water provi-
sion, the number of utility staff per 1,000 connections
is considerably lower in public countries than pri-
vate ones. Moreover, the level of ￿unaccounted for￿
water is far higher in the private countries.54 Moreo-
ver, as numerous examples show later in this section,
among developing countries, there is a growing
record of private firms who failed to turn around
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The remainder of this section examines per-
formance among competitive and monopolistic
services, as well as the critical issue of corruption.
Monopoly services and regulation
When a private provider is a natural monopoly,
public regulation is needed to prevent market fail-
ure. The mechanism for ensuring compliance of
monopolistic private providers is the performance
contract, and the government￿s main job is to en-
force it. While private providers in these sectors may
still have incentives to improve efficiency, they have
no incentive ￿ or natural pressures ￿ to translate
higher productivity into gains for consumers. For
that reason, the state emerges as the unique institu-
tion to protect the public interest. As one analyst
observed, private sector participation ￿may actually
place more rather than less demand on effective and
capable public authorities. Intervention through in-
centives requires more skill than intervention through
investment. New regulatory capacity is required to
deal with these new roles.￿55
Proponents of putting natural monopolies un-
der private provision are very enthusiastic about
performance-based contracts (PCBs). A considerable
body of economic literature has developed concern-
ing the ability of PBCs to improve the bottom-line
of firms that contract out for goods and services
that they used to produce internally. Much of this
literature concerns the so-called ￿principal-agent￿
problem. When agents (sub-contractors) have much
more information and knowledge about a given task
than the principals (contracting firms), they may be
able to withhold or manipulate that information to
their own advantage.
The only way to for the principal to overcome
this problem is through adequate monitoring and
evaluation of the agent￿s output. However, this can
be quite costly, and often forces the principal to re-
consider whether those extra costs ￿ and risks ￿ are
worth subcontracting in the first place. Generally
speaking, the easier it is to observe and measure an
output, the less costly it will be to enforce a PBC. As
outputs become more complex or subjective, the like-
lihood of undetected non-compliance or contractual
disputes grows. According to John Donahue, author
of a seminal study on privatization, when outputs
cannot be precisely described and measured, the case
for the in-house option becomes stronger. ￿The rela-
tive appeal of employing people, as opposed to con-
tracting with them, increases ... the more the task at
hand is uncertain at the outset and prone to revi-
sion.￿56
Notwithstanding the spotty record of PBCs in
the private sector, they are now a central feature of a
new development paradigm for services, commonly
called ￿output-based aid￿ (OBA). Although private
provision of government services has not been sub-
ject to systematic analysis in developing countries,
it has been in the North. Such studies reveal a very
mixed record in the developed countries, ranging
from much better, to much worse, to about the same
performance as the public sector. According to a re-
view of evidence from the United States conducted
by Columbia University Professor Elliott Sclar, pri-
vate providers tend to do a better job than govern-
ment when performing simple, low-skill activities,
and a poorer job when performing more complex
activities.57 Indeed, privatized services often cost
more than when public services were provided in-
house.
Why is this the case? As two management re-
searchers put it: ￿performance contracts are not
self-administering, self-correcting, or self-improving.
Performance contracts do not quickly or automati-
cally solve the problems of vendor performance.￿58
As former World Bank senior economist David
Ellerman put it:
From time to time, private sector management
￿discovers￿ the idea of paying for perform-
ance (not just for time put in), of paying for
outputs (not just inputs), and of management
by objectives accomplished (not just inten-
tions). It all sounds so obvious and so sensi-
ble that one must ask ￿Why didn￿t people think
of this before?￿ The answer is that they did.
And they discovered that it doesn￿t work too
well ￿ aside from fairly rude forms of labor.
In areas of human effort where effort, com-
mitment, and the application of intelligence
are important, the carrots and sticks of exter-
nal motivation are insufficient for sustained
performance. Beyond simple and specific
products, the determinants of quality are rarely
susceptible to external monitoring.59
In short, the main limitation of performance
contracts is transaction costs. As services become
more complex ￿ and as the economic and social out-
comes they are supposed to achieve become more
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lic sector inevitably gets involved. Governments
often impose strict requirements on contractors re-
garding production processes and outputs, as well
as information and reporting requirements. These
details become part of excruciatingly complex and
highly legalistic contracts, and end up raising the
costs of producing the desired services.
Even specifying a seemingly simple output such
as ￿number of connections￿ in a water contract is
unlikely, by itself, to achieve equitable social out-
comes. That is because there is inevitable uncertainty
about what kinds of goods and services are needed,
where they are need, and by whom. A World Bank
research note acknowledges this constraint: ￿Even
if a [water] contract were bid on basis of perfect in-
formation about the current status of the water
company￿s assets and about new investments needed,
the future would hold uncertainties that could not
be handled by contract. And an initial contract is
usually based on highly incomplete information.￿60
From a developmental perspective, Sclar￿s
study is revealing in two ways. First, it dispels the
myth of the superiority of private management of
public services by demonstrating just how difficult
it can be to adequately specify terms in a perform-
ance contract. Even when well-paid lawyers,
accountants, bureaucrats and technicians work to-
gether to ensure that payment is based on objectively
measured outputs, the record has often been disap-
pointing. Second, Sclar￿s study raises serious
questions about the ability of governments in poor
countries to even produce, much less enforce, the
complex contracts involved in transferring respon-
sibility for public services to profit-motivated agents
who have far more information than the principals.
Proponents of private provision are fond of
pointing out that monopoly providers require regu-
lation regardless of whether it is public or private.
And there is no shortage of evidence about the fail-
ure of public regulators to discipline failing public
providers. As the World Development Report 2003
argues, there is sometimes a ￿conflict of interest￿
when one government entity is charged with con-
trolling another. The poor performance of public
service provision thus justifies privatization even
under weak regulation. Indeed, without a private
sector to monitor, how can regulators ever learn their
job? While there may be problems and setbacks at
the beginning, over time the necessary institutions
will be created.
While there may certainly be cases in which
adequate regulation of private providers is a viable
option, it is important that policy-makers make their
decisions based on the risks of pursuing such arrange-
ments. At a minimum, they should ask how feasible
it will be to establish a functioning, independent
regulator, and the time horizon for doing so. Equally
importantly, the decision to privatize should be in-
formed by an impact analysis of private provision
under weak or non-existent regulation.
In the case of long-term contracts, lack of ad-
equate regulation at the beginning can result in a
flawed contract and regulatory ￿capture￿ that is very
difficult to overcome. Moreover, if it is possible to
create effective regulators of private providers from
scratch, it may also be possible to strengthen the
capacity and autonomy of regulators that enforce
public provision. From the perspective of the policy-
maker, it is important to ask which of these tasks is
most feasible, and to assess the relative costs of poor
regulation.
Not surprisingly, regulation in developing coun-
tries is generally weak, sometimes even non-existent.
According the World Bank publication Privatization
in Africa (1998), ￿In not one country with a privati-
zation program has there been an effort to develop a
regulatory framework as an integral part of that pro-
gram.￿ Similarly, economist Manuel Angel Abdala
concluded in his study of Latin American privatiza-
tion: ￿Widespread privatization has been encouraged
all over the region. With a few exceptions, however,
the transfer of ownership was hurried or performed
under constraints imposed by economic and politi-
cal objectives that tended to overlook the importance
of regulating private monopolies.￿61
In the developing world there is a long and
growing record of private monopoly services with
poor quality, financial mismanagement, and un-
accountably high price hikes. One of the most
spectacular failures involved Maynilad Water Serv-
ices, a French-Filipino consortium that began
supplying drinking water to about half of Manila in
1997, and touted by the World Bank as a showcase
of successful privatization. After successfully peti-
tioning the water regulator, MWSS, to grant a series
of tariff hikes that were not formally permitted un-
der the terms of the original contract, in December
2002 Maynilad angrily announced that it would ter-
minate its contract. MWSS and citizens￿ groups
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leniency for raising prices and amending the con-
tract to postpone performance targets. However, the
regulator￿s refusal to allow yet another rate hike in
late 2002 led the debt-burdened company to aban-
don the concession.62 As of this writing, litigation
for damages ￿ the government and company both
demand compensation from the other ￿ is still pend-
ing.
In 1995, a Vivendi affiliate took full control of
Puerto Rico￿s water utility PRASA. Four years later
the Office of the Comptroller issued a scathing re-
port, describing unsatisfactory maintenance and
repair, incomplete financial disclosure, neglect of
consumer inquiries, customers billed without receiv-
ing water, and financial mismanagement that
required stop-gap funding from the state develop-
ment bank. Not far away, in the Dominican Republic,
the 1999 privatization of the electricity utility ￿
which admittedly was in very bad shape ￿ has been
a major disappointment. By 2001, blackouts were
even higher than under public provision ￿Business
owners have refused to pay higher prices for an even
worse service with the result that whole communi-
ties are now disconnected.￿63
In Orissa, India, a special government commis-
sion was appointed to review the state￿s energy
reform program, which included private provision
of electricity from United States-based AES. In May
2001, after consulting with stakeholders from the
provider, government, and consumers, a state-ap-
pointed review committee comprised of retired
officials and academics issued a blistering report,
which described: no progress in improving transmis-
sion losses after five years, deterioration of bill
collection, higher debt, increased costs of genera-
tion, steep tariff increases with no corresponding
improvement in finances, and the virtual absence of
new capital investment.64
In the 2003 Social Watch Report, a number of
country reports describe serious performance fail-
ures under private provision.65 Before being resold
in 2002, Bulgaria￿s private water company routinely
overcharged customers, randomly cut off services,
and failed to respond to consumer complaints. Be-
tween 2000 and 2001, El Salvador￿s privatized
electricity companies presided over 44,000 power
outages and saw half a million customer complaints.
The list of grievances from Nicaragua included in-
correct (and uncorrected) billing, service paid for
but not delivered for public street lighting, as well
as voltage failures resulting in damage to small ap-
pliances and business production.
Competitive services and choice ￿ but for whom?
For services with (at least potentially) low bar-
riers to entry, the rationale for private provision is
choice; consumers buy services based on price and
quality. Here the government￿s main role is to en-
sure adequate levels of competition that create viable
choices for all citizens. Expanding private provision
in competitive service sectors can certainly increase
choice ￿ but not necessarily for all consumers.
A pervasive problem associated with greater
choice is the practice of ￿cherry picking￿. When
private providers enter the market, they have strong
incentives to serve primarily people who are able to
pay commercial prices, and who enable firms to
minimize overhead costs. Not only are poor people
least able to pay. They are often the most costly to
serve, living in less accessible areas, and more prone
to getting sick.
Especially when existing public services are of
low quality, expanding the choice of providers draws
better off consumers into the private sector. How-
ever, those who are unable to afford commercially
priced private services must remain with the state,
thus creating a ￿two tier￿ system based on income.
Public services that are funded through progressive
cross-subsidies ￿ or where high-use customers ac-
count for the bulk of revenues ￿ are especially
vulnerable to increased private sector participation,
which reduces the public sector￿s revenue base.
If policy-makers do not address market failures
associated with natural disincentives to serve vul-
nerable populations, improved efficiency may go
hand in hand with increased social exclusion. Policy
constraints inevitably raise issues of fairness. On one
hand, neither middle class consumers (nor anyone
else) should be forced to use low quality services. If
greater choice can improve quality and efficiency,
such benefits should not be ignored. On the other
hand, poor people are already marginalized politi-
cally. After addressing the interests of the more
influential constituencies by increasing private pro-
vision, governments may be tempted to ￿move on￿
and neglect complementary policies needed to serve
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Multilateral lenders and borrowing govern-
ments increasingly turn to the catch-all policy of
￿social safety nets￿ to address equity under private
provision policies. When done well, these can be
effectively targeted subsidies and ￿lifeline tariffs￿
that ensure provision for all. At worst, they can be a
budgetary gesture with no programmatic features to
reach intended beneficiaries.
Privatization advocates frequently cite health
care as an area in which competition can generate
both greater efficiency and superior service. (The
argument is difficult to make for utilities, since they
tend to be monopolies, making public regulation
essential.) However, claims about the ability of the
private sector to improve equity and choice in health
care provision are contradicted by considerable evi-
dence about imperfect information and ￿market
failure, such as those arising from the strong power
imbalance between providers and patients.￿66 Even
for contracting out of specific services, an empirical
review calls into question the private sector￿s man-
agement capabilities, the existence of genuine
competition and the translation of competition into
efficiency gains, as well as government capacity to
deign and enforce appropriate contracts with private
providers.67
Provision of health care is unusually complex.
There is a vast array of public, private, and mixed
systems that range from highly successful to dys-
functional. Unlike basic infrastructure, choosing
health care reform is not a matter of selecting among
a small number of distinct models with clear owner-
ship arrangements, but rather shaping incentives for
public and private providers. There is no ￿boiler-
plate￿ health care contract that a government can
easily adapt to its own circumstances.
However, there is growing consensus on sev-
eral principles about health care provision. Accord-
ing to an IMF researcher: ￿Allocation can not be
based solely on cost-effectiveness, which focuses on
efficiency, but ignores equity ... Markets alone can-
not produce efficient outcome in the health care sec-
tor, which suffers serious [market] failures due to
asymmetry of information, imperfect agency rela-
tionships, barriers to entry and moral hazard.￿ Be-
cause patients know far less than physicians about
how to ￿consume￿ health care, doctors have tremen-
dous power to induce consumption.68 In other words,
because of the supply-side particularities of health
care, demand can be induced with relatively little
consideration for price. As a result, private provi-
sion that is not rigorously regulated is often charac-
terized by over-supply.
Another area in which competition is supposed
to demonstrate the potential of private service pro-
vision is electricity generation (as opposed to
distribution, which is usually a natural monopoly).
When different energy producers are allowed to en-
ter the market, using different kinds of fuel and
production processes, customers should benefit
through lower prices. However, deregulated energy
sectors in a number of localities in highly industri-
alized countries have been characterized by market
manipulation and spectacular price increases. Cali-
fornia in the United States and Ontario and Alberta
in Canada, could not control electricity prices under
a unregulated power market. Regulators in develop-
ing countries that promote private sector generation
therefore face a daunting challenge.
Fighting corruption
One of the most common justifications for pri-
vatizing services is the high level of corruption often
evident in government-provided services. However,
if there was ever a double-edged sword in the de-
bate over reforming services, corruption is it. Private
provision proponents argue that front-line govern-
ment service providers routinely engage in petty
bribery and theft of supplies, and portray high rank-
ing officials as perpetrators of massive graft. They
have no shortage of evidence. Skeptics, in turn, can
choose from a large and growing menu of non-trans-
parent and criminal practices among firms that
deliver essential services. Former World Bank Chief
Economist Joseph Stiglitz once memorably referred
to privatization as ￿briberization￿. This paper draws
no conclusions about which is worse. Rather, it pro-
poses that policy-makers assess existing or potential
accountability mechanisms as they consider which kind
of provider is more likely to serve public welfare.
Neither public officials nor private businesses
are inherently honest. If not made accountable to
service users, both can engage in the most egregious
rent-seeking activities. Information disclosure and
external monitoring are therefore essential for both
kinds of arrangements. Corrupt governments clean
up their act only when they have to answer to citi-
zens. Where policy-makers depend on rent-seeking
elites for political survival, or citizens lack the in-18 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 31
formation they need to evaluate the behavior of those
entrusted to serve the public, accountability is hard
to deliver. By contrast, private firms refrain from
corruption when they have to answer to government.
Because they are directly accountable to sharehold-
ers, keeping them honest requires, above all, an
effective public regulator.
If one accepts the premise that ungoverned
profit-maximizing companies are no more philan-
thropic than their public sector counterparts, then
state institutions become the weakest link in fight-
ing corruption regardless of who the provider is.
What tends to be lost in the debate over service re-
form is that regulatory integrity is the key to both
effective public and private provision.
The 2004 World Development Report promotes
the perspective of many private provision advocates
who seek to ￿separate the policy-maker from the
provider￿. They argue that when the same govern-
ment charged with delivering services must also
monitor and regulate the service provider, an inherent
conflict of interest weakens internal accountability.
Accordingly, they maintain that increasing user fees
and increasing choice will make consumers less tol-
erant of poor quality in general, and corruption in
particular. Private provision and commercialization
thus ￿empower￿ consumers and force providers to
behave in an accountable manner.
Critics of this perspective, however, respond
that there is no substitute for effective regulation
when it comes to essential services. Especially for
natural monopolies like utilities, the question of
choice is moot; regulation is the only way to prevent
a variety of market failures, including corruption.
Even for competitive services like health care and
health insurance, public authority is required to pro-
tect consumers from fraud and abuse. Industrialized
western countries have created thousands of such
regulations and an enormous regulatory apparatus
to fulfill this purpose.
Yet even in countries with strong institutions,
control over information provides ample opportu-
nity for firms to cheat government and tax-payers.
In the United States, the nation￿s second largest hos-
pital chain paid $54 million to the government to
settle claims that doctors at a California hospital
performed hundreds of unnecessary heart operations
and then billed government insurance programs for
reimbursement. In July 2003, a leading medical labo-
ratory in the United States paid over half a billion
dollars in fines after pleading guilty to obstructing
investigations over its conspiracy to defraud gov-
ernment healthcare programs.69 
The ￿privatization paradox￿ described at the
beginning of this paper is especially perplexing when
it comes to good governance in developing coun-
tries with weak institutions. The same government
officials that were too corrupt to deliver services to
citizens are expected to be immune to the lucrative
inducements of private firms. Public sector manag-
ers unable to control the behavior of front-line
government agencies must somehow enforce com-
pliance with standards of corporate responsibility.
While public service employees may steal from
consumers, supply warehouses and budgets, private
providers also have numerous opportunities for cor-
ruption and regulatory capture. These include the
bidding process for public contracts, the establish-
ment of contractual terms, enforcement of contract
compliance (including tariff changes), and anti-com-
petitive collusion. Moreover, the more money is at
stake, the greater the potential for corrupt behavior.
For example, according to the World Bank itself,
￿transnational firms headquartered abroad are more
likely than other firms to pay public procurement
kickbacks.￿70 Corporate corruption is not an isolated
phenomenon. In the United States, accounting scan-
dals at Enron and WorldComm preceded record-
breaking bankruptcies, while energy companies have
been implicated in manipulation of the price of elec-
tricity in California￿s deregulated market.71
There are countless examples of corruption in
privatizations undertaken developing countries.72
Among the best known is the infamous ￿loans for
shares￿ scandal in Russia, in which a large propor-
tion of the country￿s most valuable assets were sold
off to political insiders for a fraction of their worth.73
In Papau New Guinea, the national Ombudsman
Commission investigated a Build-Own-Transfer con-
cession to the Malaysian firm JC-KRTA. It concluded
that the contract award involved favours from high-
level politicians and was based on personal contacts
with the government.74 In Orissa, India, a govern-
ment-appointed committee reported illegal behaviour
on the part of a major private generator, including,
non-payment to the transmission company, the re-
fusal to provide concessional pricing arrangements
stipulated by the regulatory commission, and non-
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Rationale no. 4 ￿ making reform irreversible
One of the most compelling rationales for
private provision is that it helps make reforms
permanent. The ebb and flow of the political system
creates a certain degree of uncertainty. What one
reformer accomplishes today may be undone by the
next administration. Private provision is thus a use-
ful way to remove policy from the political agenda.
It is much easier to increase subsidies or reverse
employment cutbacks than to re-nationalize private
assets or expel private firms from the market.
Permanence has its attraction, but it is impor-
tant that only the right reforms be cast in stone.
Unfortunately, policy-makers often lack sufficient
information and analysis to be able to predict the
social and economic impacts of major reforms. In
this sense, while making effective reforms irrevers-
ible is highly desirable, it would be dangerous to
leave no exit door behind for policies that are poorly
implemented, have far deeper negative impacts than
initially believed, or have major unintended conse-
quences that were not originally considered. Thus,
before making decisions that preclude reversal or
even significant modification, policy-makers should
undertake a focused analysis of expected impacts
over time.
One implicit premise underlying the rationale
for policy permanence is that the political system is
inherently corrupt and responsive to rent-seeking
interests. Thus it is better to prevent anyone from
making policy changes than allow policy to be con-
stantly subject to manipulation and political calculus.
Policy-makers in many countries may have good
reason to be sympathetic to such a premise. How-
ever, to the extent the existing system excludes the
poor, rural people or other marginalized groups from
essential services, policy-makers should determine
whether any permanent policy alternative is more
likely to improve the status quo or lock-in (or deepen)
current inequities. Upon reflection, they may con-
clude that only by directly challenging political elites
can government truly advance public welfare.
The most common way that government can
tie its own hands in service reform is through priva-
tization or long-term private concessions. Expro-
priating private property (and to a lesser extent
rescinding a legal contract) is typically considered a
radical, populist and irresponsible act, especially by
investors upon which governments depend to gen-
erate jobs and economic growth. Such actions can
bring the wrath of multilateral and bilateral lenders,
and lead private rating agencies to seriously down-
grade sovereign credit risk. Because such pressures
can lead to higher interest rates or even a cutoff of
credit, private provision can effectively remove gov-
ernment from service provision for the foreseeable
future.
Even in cases where it is politically feasible to
take back control of essential services, over time
private provision may make such an alternative im-
possible for more practical reasons. Especially when
it comes to complex, integrated sectors such as utili-
ties, surrendering the capacity to deliver services may
make it impossible for the government to turn back
the clock.
When governments transfer control over their
water system to private companies, the loss
of internal skills and expertise may be irre-
versible, or nearly so. Many contracts are long
term ￿ for as much as 10 to 20 years. Manage-
ment expertise, engineering knowledge, and
other assets in the public domain may be lost
for good. Indeed, while there is growing ex-
perience with the transfer of such assets to
private hands, there is little or no recent expe-
rience with the public sector re-acquiring such
assets from the private sector.76
Multilateral trading system and services
Governments can also make public service re-
forms permanent through legally binding constraints.
Perhaps the most controversial of these is through
the WTO￿s General Agreement on Trade in Serv-
ices. (For an overview of the Agreement￿s provisions,
see annex E.) While GATS does not privatize serv-
ices, it does limits the ability of governments to take
actions that affect the competitive position of for-
eign investors. Therefore the impact of GATS does
not derive from the sale or contracting out of public
assets, but rather from restriction on government
regulation or subsidizing of service providers, espe-
cially in ways that provide advantages that might
discriminate against an existing or potentially exist-
ing competitor.77
Once a government has made specific sectoral
commitments under the GATS, it may only reverse
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pensation with all affected parties ￿ a costly under-
taking that virtually ensures continuity. The WTO
itself declares that ￿because unbinding is difficult,
[government] commitments [to a sector] are virtu-
ally guaranteed ...￿78 This means that if subsequent
events reveal serious negative social or economic
effects, it may be too late to take corrective action.
While WTO officials routinely deny that GATS
applies to basic public services, the ambiguity of
existing language suggests otherwise. GATS does
exempt those services ￿supplied in the exercise of
governmental authority￿, but defines those services
as being provided neither on a competitive nor com-
mercials basis. Thus for services in which govern-
ments compete with private providers or charge cost
covering fees, it seems quite plausible that they po-
tentially fall under GATS jurisdiction. Moreover, in
the current round of negotiations, northern countries
have already made numerous requests for opening
up water, electricity, health and education services,
making it quite clear that governments are now be-
ing pressured to make commitments in essential serv-
ices that will be fully subject to GATS disciplines.
It is revealing that even as northern govern-
ments pressure southern countries to open up their
essential service sectors, citizens from these coun-
tries, including public service managers, local
governments, consumer advocacy and policy re-
search organizations, have mobilized to demand that
their government refrain from making irreversible
commitments that could undermine government￿s
ability to regulate or subsidize essential services.
Indeed, the entire European Union has categorically
excluded these services from its GATS commit-
ments.79
The WTO and its supporters characterize op-
ponents of GATS as uninformed and alarmist. Yet
neither the WTO nor the multilateral lending insti-
tutions have prepared a framework for assessing even
the economic ￿ to say nothing of the social impact ￿
of opening services under GATS.80 The argument
made here is not that liberalizing trade in essential
services is always a bad decision. Rather, it is that
policy-makers are fully justified in demanding more
information about the consequences of that liberali-
zation before jumping in with both feet.
Many who track WTO processes have observed
that it may be impossible to apply tradition ￿safe-
guard￿ measures to GATS commitments. While trade
in good in primarily about tariffs and quotas, trade
in services is primarily about investment restrictions.
A government facing negative balance of payment
or employment impacts in manufacturing can tem-
porarily raise tariffs and limit imports. However, it
cannot simply stop foreign firms with domestic in-
vestments from providing services ￿ even for a
limited time.
For many competitive services, safeguards may
intractably difficult to implement. Yet for essential
services whose primary purpose is human welfare,
governments should insist on greater flexibility for
policy actions that affect foreign investors. One ap-
proach might be to create safeguards involving
regulation and subsidy allocation ￿ rather than
direct expropriation or forced exit ￿ and the devel-
opment of objective indicators that make it possible
to measure negative social impacts from liberaliza-
tion.
With such a framework in place, it would be
possible to specify an impact threshold for applying
safeguards, enabling governments to respond quickly
with policies that may not be normally WTO-con-
sistent. While foreign investors may dislike any
measure that could undermine their competitiveness
or profitability, objective social impact indicators
would help ensure that safeguards are not hijacked
by protectionist interests.
V. Conclusion
While many of the rationales for private provi-
sion are compelling, private provision in practice
does not always deliver on the benefits associated
with those rationales. In some cases, private service
delivery results in a fiasco, while in other cases un-
deniable improvements are evident. However, in
many of the latter cases, the economic logic under-
lying private provision of essential services can
exclude or harm poor people, or force the govern-
ment to assume far costs that rival or vastly exceed
those of public sector reform.
Moreover, the benefits of private provision are
often most doubtful precisely where public services
are performing the worst. Governments that already
have strong institutions and accountability mecha-
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policies quite effectively. However, they are also
more likely to have effective service providers and
low levels of corruption to begin with. On the other
hand, rent-seeking public institution and govern-
ments driven by special interests typically deliver
poor quality services, or limit access to the privi-
leged few. While there may be much room for
improvement, such governments offer little hope
for properly regulating private firms that deliver
services.
Proponents of private provision often assume
a ￿counter-factual of inaction￿. They compare best-
case private provision scenario with continuation of
failing public service. The implication in much pri-
vatization literature is that government is simply
beyond hope. Yet there are often viable options for
reforming public services, especially by increasing
accountability to citizens, and making budgets more
progressive. In many cases, the constraints on these
options are starkly political, while in others the need
is for greater technical capacity or better organiza-
tional incentives. Before committing to private
provision, especially with weak regulatory capac-
ity, governments should assess the constraints to
￿doing privatization right￿, the costs of doing it
wrong, and options for reforming existing public
sector services. Toward that end, this paper encour-
ages policy-makers to:
￿ Determine which kinds of institutions are
needed for different provision options.
￿ Assess the feasibility and time horizon for
strengthening or creating those institutions.
￿ Evaluate the risks of attempting different paths
of reforms and ask whether those risks are ac-
ceptable.
￿ Estimate the potential social and economic
costs of service provision while appropriate in-
stitutions are being built.
￿ Consider a range of roles that the private sec-
tor might play in essential service.
Most participants in the debate over reforming
services may agree with the idea of keeping policy
options open until analysis and evidence are avail-
able. However, in practice much policy advice leaves
room for only limited options within a single, pre-
determined approach. Yet policy-makers need not
have to choose between ￿all-or-nothing￿ as they
consider alternatives for policy reform.
Pace and sequence are critical. Experience with
￿big-bang￿ structural reforms has been disappoint-
ing, because the institutions required to make them
work are usually not in place. A gradual, cautious
approach can help governments avoid big mistakes
and also enable learning that translates into subse-
quent policy action. In the case of essential services,
full private sector management (or ownership) of
service delivery may suddenly give government with
new responsibilities that it is not willing or able to
fulfill.
Private provision contracts need not delegate
wholesale management of complex services to a
single provider. Within the private sector, large cor-
porations contract out specific tasks to smaller firms
in order to increase efficiency or production flex-
ibility ￿ while maintaining full control over finished
products and services. Similarly, governments may
continue to provide essential services directly while
using contracts to produce important inputs into fi-
nal service delivery: e.g., construction, installation
of household utility connections, meter reading and
bill collection, etc.
For example, there is an important distinction
between service contract, which assigns responsi-
bility for isolated tasks, and management contracts,
in which ￿management authority is transferred to the
private sector. The more isolated the task, the less
risk the private is expected to assume. Privatization
advocates point out that service contracts under weak
public management are unlikely to result in signifi-
cant improvement.81 However, by the same taken,
where regulatory capacity is weak, governments are
unlikely to enforce private sector compliance with
terms of complex and sweeping management contracts.
Weak states therefore present obstacles to both
public and private service delivery options. The chal-
lenge for policy makers is to determine how to
structure and sequence reforms so as to enhance the
government capacities needed to make chosen re-
forms effective. As they begin the reform process,
governments can harness the efficiency and incen-
tives or private provision without taking big risks.
For example, private firms may bid on delivering
specific elements of service delivery to government
buyers, rather than delivering the entire service to
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Particularly where institutions are weak, gov-
ernments as customers (typically monopsonies) are
likely to have far greater ability to hold private firms
accountable than individuals. Greater efficiency in
these areas may help improve service quality or
financial sustainability, thereby contributing to
effective public sector reform. Alternatively, as gov-
ernment learns how to monitor and regulate limited
private provision activities, it may become better





FDI is usually portrayed as an economic bless-
ing that countries should strive to increase. To be
sure, a drop in FDI can cause losses in capital, tech-
nology and jobs, However, recent evidence reveals
a number of limitations to development strategies
that prioritize high levels of FDI.
￿ FDI share is higher in countries with higher
quality institutions, suggesting that countries
trying to expand their access to international
capital markets should concentrate on devel-
oping credible enforcement mechanisms
instead of trying to get more FDI.82 There is
very little evidence that more open investment
regimes or investment protection treaties do
much to stimulate foreign direct investment.83
Rather, foreign corporations appear to be at-
tracted primarily by the prospects of high
profits, either from exploiting the domestic
market or by achieving cost savings on export
production through low wage labour.
￿ FDI in some sectors can weaken governments
vis-￿-vis foreign corporations, which can ex-
ercise considerable influence over public policy
through control of information and manage-
ment decisions. Chairman of Barclays Capital
Chairman Hans Joerg Rudloff ￿ hardly an enemy
of capitalism ￿ stated: ￿I￿m not a protectionist,
but [some] countries sold their silver spoons to
foreign buyers without any safeguard for their
national interests. They didn￿t realize that by
selling all of their assets like utilities and their
banking industries to foreign investors they
moved the entire decision-making power over
their economic destiny in their own country to
people in other parts of the world.￿84 Even as
the United States, Europe and Japan seek to
open up developing country markets to their
corporations, governments in these countries
routinely limit the ability of foreign investors
to control firms or sectors involved in national
security, technology development, financial
markets, and essential services.
￿ FDI can have detrimental effects on the bal-
ance of payments. Recent research suggests that
levels of FDI stock in developing countries are
far higher than currently believed, and that the
rates of return on these investments is extremely
high. The repatriation of profits reduces net
foreign exchange inflows for foreign invest-
ment in export sectors. FDI in sectors like
essential services can actually undermine the
balance of payments. According to economist
David Woodward, a former staff member of the
office of the Executive Director of the United
Kingdom to the World Bank and IMF: ￿For
equity investment and some types of direct in-
vestment (especially the purchase of existing
productive capacity and new investment in non-
tradeable sectors), the net foreign exchange
effect will be substantially negative.￿85
Annex B
External pressures for local
government austerity
The experience of state-owned enterprises
(SOEs) suggests the need for caution when making
fiscal arrangements with local governments that
deliver essential services. Former World Bank
economist John Nellis, now a researcher at the Center
for Global Development in Washington, states that
commonly: ￿IMF involvement and surveillance [of
the economy] led to a choking off of direct budget-
ary financing of SOEs ... In response, private sector
management, financing or ownership was proposed.
The World Bank then became more directly involved
in terms of reform/ privatization design, and assist-
ance in implementation.￿86 One way that the IMF
imposes fiscal discipline on central governments in
decentralized countries is to cut back fiscal trans-23 Assessing the Risks in the Private Provision of Essential Services
fers during periods of economic difficulty. Another
is to forbid central governments from bailing out
local ones that raise their own resources through bor-
rowing.
An example from Bolivia is illustrative. To help
curb instability and foster investment, the IMF and
the World Bank may direct governments to promote
the development of a municipal credit market. In
recent loans, the World Bank required that the Gov-
ernment of Bolivia use revenue intercepts as
collateral to municipal credit operations with any
lender, and to require municipalities to enter into
Financial Restructuring Agreements (FRAs) ensur-
ing that they maintain hard budget ceilings.87 Such
steps are intended to improve the access of munici-
palities to international financing, by increasing
confidence among investors. Seven municipalities
entered into FRAs and accepted fiscal targets that
were based on the IMF￿s assumption of 4 per cent
GDP growth in 2001. The actual GDP growth rate
was only 1.2 per cent. Central government revenues
plunged by 26 per cent in 2001 and general trans-
fers from the central to municipal governments were
11 per cent less than projected. Because municipali-
ties with FRAs were constrained from borrowing;
they instituted new local taxes and user fees and
carried out cutbacks in programms and staffing.
When appropriate fiscal resources are not pro-
vided, decentralization can lead to local services that
are segregated by income. In South Africa, after de-
centralization reform and re-zoning, the municipality
of Nelspruit found its population multiplied by a
factor of ten in 1994, while its total revenues grew
only by 38 per cent. Moreover, most of the new resi-
dents were poorer people. These challenges were
increased further after the 2000 demarcation proc-
ess, which doubled the municipality￿s population of
the municipality, while keeping the same tax base.
As a result, cash-strapped local government wanted
to ￿wash its hands of responsibility￿ for water by
handing it over to a private concession.88 In this epi-
sode, privatization of water became a convenient
political exit strategy for local officials desperately
lacking resources. A review of Latin American edu-
cation reform in four decentralized countries
(Mexico, Argentina, Chile and Colombia) revealed
severe reductions in public spending (primary teach-
ers￿ salaries) and a widening of the quality gap
between public and private providers.89 In sub-Sa-
haran Africa, where inadequate fiscal transfers,
restricted local revenue raising and poor planning




Private lenders and investors in infrastructure
projects seek to protect themselves from risks by
obtaining commercial or political guarantees from
export credit agencies, private insurers, and multi-
lateral institutions. Such guarantees shift private
sector risk onto taxpayers ￿ precisely the reverse of
what privatization proponents promise for greater
private sector participation in services. When pri-
vate firms lend to or invest in a water project in a
borrowing country, the Bank￿s guarantee promises
the private firms compensation for certain losses if,
under specified conditions, the borrower does not
meet its obligations. The MDBs claim that guaran-
tees are indispensable for building confidence and
providing the incentive for private financiers to in-
vest in infrastructure projects. Critics argue that such
guarantees distort risk calculations and foist unsus-
tainable price, demand, and currency risks upon the
government.
The MDBs offer two primary types of guaran-
tees:
￿ Partial risk guarantees cover government ob-
ligations spelled out in agreements with the
project entity and ensure payment in the case
of debt service default resulting from non-per-
formance of contractual obligations undertaken
by governments or their agencies in private
sector projects.
￿ Partial credit guarantees cover all events of
non-payment for a specified part of financing.
This helps to extend maturity periods, which is
often significant in obtaining longer-term fi-
nancing for large construction projects.
There is not a clear distinction between politi-
cal and commercial realms, an ambiguity that creates
its own set of problems. As a general rule, however,
the commercial side refers to the risks to profits due
to production inefficiencies or lack of demand. The
political aspect risks refer to those risks over which
the government has some measure of power. Miti-24 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 31
gating political risks involves obtaining government
commitments not to expropriate private holding, to
protect the investment from consequences of war and
unrest. The World Bank guarantees also cover local
currency financing.
The World Bank is exploring arrangements that
will help sub-sovereign borrowers obtain financing
without needing sovereign guarantees. The Swedish
International Development Cooperation Agency
(SIDA) helped to establish GuarantCo, which will pro-
vide partial guarantees on issues of paper by private
sector infrastructure service providers and possibly
municipalities and/or public sector authorities.
The Bank￿s issuance of guarantees can consti-
tute a serious conflict of interest. If the bank action
to address social or environmental difficulties with
privately-financed projects results in the disruption
of a project or an escalation of costs, the guarantee
could be called. In other words, it could be in the
public interest for the Bank to ￿blow the whistle￿ on
privately-financed projects. However, the Bank
would be constrained from taking such action given
its liability ￿ namely, the guarantee.
Furthermore, since guarantees are provided by
the private sector, it is redundant for the MDBs to
offer these products. If projects are not viable, the
Bank could be seriously distorting risk calculations
by providing extra comfort to investors and lenders.
Assuming that the institutions do continue to utilize
guarantees, they should use investment screens to
ensure that projects meet specified ￿sustainable de-
velopment￿ criteria.
Investment screens have been commonly used
by private investors in the United States and other
industrialized nations to select the portfolios of So-
cially Responsible Investment (SRI) funds. An
investment screen is a set of non-financial (such as
social or environmental) criteria that must be met
by all companies in an investment portfolio. There
are two kinds of investment screens: ￿negative
screens￿ which are a set of criteria delineating what
characteristics companies in the portfolio cannot
have (production of nuclear weapons; operations in
Burma; Superfund sites, etc.); and ￿positive screens￿,
which are a set of criteria delineating what charac-
teristics companies in the portfolio must have.
Annex D
Hubco: Pakistan￿s power dispute
In its efforts to attract foreign capital to the
energy sector, Pakistan developed a policy frame-
work of financial incentives that included a long-term
PPA. According to a case study published by the
American University, ￿Investors were reassured that
the Water and Power Development Authority
(WAPDA) and the Karachi Electric Supply Corpo-
ration (KESC) would purchase electricity for a very
reasonable 6.5 cents/kwh.￿
This guaranteed the foreign producer that re-
gardless of a potential drop in demand for electricity,
the government would purchase the supply of elec-
tricity at a favorable prices. Pakistan￿s largest power
plant in 1997 was Hubco, located about 40 km north-
west of Karachi. ￿The state-owned WAPDA will
purchase power from Hubco and the power purchase
agreement assures a guaranteed revenue equivalent
to 60 per cent of gross capacity utilization, irrespec-
tive of the actual takeoff from the power station.￿91
At the time Hubco was going online, the World
Bank hailed the arrival of independent power pro-
ducers as a solution for Pakistan￿s energy shortage,
as well as a way to stem subsidy outlays needed to
cover loss-making public generators. However,
shortly after operations began, problems resulting
from the PPA became apparent. As the Asian Devel-
opment Bank￿s Country Director to Pakistan ex-
plained:
With the commissioning of some IPP power
plants in 1997, WAPDA and KESC purchased
electricity from these IPPs. From 1998, Paki-
stan had excess capacity with the utilities con-
tracted to purchase expensive IPP electricity
while their own plants were underutilized.
Faced with the problem of having to purchase
power from the IPPs and the two private sec-
tor operators - HUBCO and KAPCO at an
expensive rate, the Government￿s financing of
other public enterprises in the power sector
was adversely affected. The Government con-
tended that the $0.065/kWh rate of the IPPs,
as per their agreement with the previous Gov-
ernment, is unaffordable for a country like
Pakistan. In 1996 and 1997, WAPDA and
KESC faced serious liquidity problems and
defaulted on some of their financial commit-
ments.9225 Assessing the Risks in the Private Provision of Essential Services
The year after, the Sharif administration ac-
cused Hubco of using deception to influence the
former Bhutto government to accept an excessively
priced PPA with WAPDA. Although corruption
charges were not upheld in court, tariffs were even-
tually reduced by a significant margin.
The Hubco case not only demonstrates the fis-
cal problems that PPAs can cause, but also the
difficulties of governments lacking experience with
complex contracts. Particularly in poor countries
characterized by high risk, powerful corporations are
in a strong position to demand lucrative contract
terms from governments lacking negotiating power
and skill. The ￿take it or leave it￿ position of a domi-
nant firm can leave a government with no choice
but to offer concessions never contemplated in text-
books on economic theory.
Annex E
An overview of the General Agreement
on Trade in Services
GATS went into effect as part of the World
Trade Organization on 1 January 1995. Its purpose
is the progressive liberalization of trade in services
under four distinct ￿modes￿:
1. Cross-border supply: ability of non-residents
to supply services within another Member￿s ter-
ritory.
2. Consumption abroad: freedom to purchase
services in the territory of another Member.
3. Commercial presence: opportunity for foreign
suppliers to establish, operate or expand a com-
mercial entity in a Member￿s territory, such as
a branch, agency, or wholly owned subsidiary.
4. Presence of natural persons: permission for
entry and temporary stay in the Member￿s ter-
ritory of foreign individuals in order to supply
a service.
The Agreement calls for successive rounds of
negotiation to extend GATS coverage into new
service sectors, and to specify rules that affect gov-
ernments￿ ability to regulate or participate in those
sectors. GATS applies to all WTO members, which
are subject to legally binding dispute settlement de-
cisions.
GATS has potentially far-reaching effects, since
a wide range of services may fall under its jurisdic-
tion. The Agreement excludes services that are
￿provided in the exercise of government authority￿,
which means that the service must be provided on
neither a commercial nor a competitive basis. Cur-
rently, however, it is difficult to determine the precise
scope of the Agreement, since there is a great deal
of controversy over these important qualifications.
Once a government has made a commitment
under GATS, it can be very hard to reverse. If a gov-
ernment does choose to withdraw from a previous
commitment, it must compensate other Members
whose service suppliers may be adversely affected.
GATS protects foreign service suppliers and inves-
tors through several basic rules. Some of these rules
apply only when approved by Members for specific
service sectors.
￿ Most favored nation. Government must extend
any regulation or financial measure that ben-
efits one foreign service provider to all foreign
providers. Most-favored nation treatment ap-
plies automatically to all sectors unless a
member explicitly excludes that sector from the
MFN rule.
￿ National treatment. Government must offer
￿best treatment￿ of domestic service providers
to foreign providers. If competition is altered
to favour domestic providers, even as an unin-
tended consequence of promoting domestic
social goals, a measure can be ruled as discrimi-
natory. National treatment provisions apply
only to sectors in which a country affirmatively
lists commitments.
￿ Market access. Government may not restrict
the number of service suppliers or employees
in a sector, the value of transactions, or the types
of legal entities that may supply a service. Like
national treatment, market access provisions
only apply when a country explicitly makes this
commitment in a sector.
￿ Monopolies and exclusive providers. Govern-
ments may exercise monopoly for a service
sector, but can only do so by listing the sector
as a country-specific exception. Governments26 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 31
that make commitments in this area area can-
not use their power in a way that violates MFN,
national treatment or market access commit-
ments.
￿ Domestic regulation. Still under negotiation in
Geneva, these provisions could create some
form of ￿necessity test￿ to be applied to regula-
tions such as professional qualification, technical
standards and licensing procedures. Regulations
determined to pursue non-legitimate objectives
or to be ￿more trade restrictive than necessary￿
by a dispute settlement panel would not be per-
mitted.
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